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Waiving Goodbye: In Memory of the
Reasonable-Doubt Standard
by STEVEN WALL*
I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.
- In re Winship, Justice Harlan, (concurring)
Introduction
This note addresses the issue of innocent defendants pleading guilty
despite the existence of evidence suggesting their innocence, specifically in
cases involving misconduct by government agents. In the trial context, The
Due Process Clause guarantees defendants the disclosure of all favorable
evidence material to either guilt or punishment.2  By contrast, plea
bargaining lacks these assurances.3 In limiting the scope of this discovery
right, the Supreme Court has whittled away a key due process pre-trial
protection for criminal defendants despite repeatedly underscoring the
importance of guilty pleas to the administration of criminal justice.
* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I would
like to give a special thank you to Profesor Ahmed Ghappour for his unwavering guidance,
advice, and support. I also want to thank all of the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly.
1. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970).
2. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that due process requires
prosecutors to make pre-trial disclosures of all favorable evidence after the prosecutor withheld a
statement in which another man explicitly admitted to committing the crime-evidence that was
not discovered by the defendant until after his trial).
3. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (holding that failure to make pre-
guilty plea disclosures of material impeachment evidence is not a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment because impeachment evidence is important only in its "relation to the fairness of a
trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary ('knowing,' 'intelligent,' and 'sufficient[ly]
aware')").
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The Supreme Court has recognized that our criminal justice system is,
for the most part, a system of pleas rather than trials.4 Over ninety-seven
percent of federal cases and ninety-four percent of state cases are settled by
guilty pleas.5  In fact, the Supreme Court explained, "[i]t is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system."6
In guilty pleas, defendants elect to forgo trial and voluntarily accept
their conviction, usually in exchange for reduced sentencing. In a pretrial
process known as "plea bargaining," defendants negotiate with prosecutors
by bartering their personal rights, such as their constitutional right to a fair
trial, in exchange for a prosecutor's promise not to seek the maximum
sentence.7 As a negotiated settlement, guilty pleas are considered contracts
between defendants and prosecutors and are largely beneficial to both
parties.8 Prosecutors are guaranteed a conviction without the difficulties of
a trial, and defendants receive more lenient sentences.
Nonetheless, defendants in the plea bargaining process are not entitled
to the same due process rights as defendants preparing for trial. In the
seminal case Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires prosecutors to make
pretrial disclosures of all favorable evidence material to the guilt or
4. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (finding the government's position that
a fair trial counterbalances ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining ignored "the
reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials");
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2010) (noting that "[t]o a large extent . . . horse trading
[between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is
what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal
justice system.") (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REv. 989, 1034 (2006) (arguing that larger sentences exist mainly to
incentivize guilty pleas and are greater than Congress and prosecutors actually believe is
appropriate).
5. See supra note 4 (referring to the prevalence of guilty pleas in the modem criminal
justice system and emphasizing that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel-traditionally a right reserved for trial-extends pre-trial and applies to plea bargaining).
6. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1912).
7. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909
(1992) ("The parties to these settlements trade various risks and entitlements: the defendant
relinquishes the right to go to trial (along with any chance of acquittal), while the prosecutor
gives up the entitlement to seek the highest sentence or pursue the most serious charges possible.
The resulting bargains differ predictably from what would have happened had the same cases
been taken to trial. Defendants who bargain for a plea serve lower sentences than those who do
not.").
8. Id. at 1909-10 n.2 (noting that guilty pleas are generally analyzed under contract
principles, and highlighting that in 1986, the average sentence of defendants convicted of a
serious felony at trial had an average sentence of 145 months, while similar defendants who pled
were sentenced to 72 months).
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punishment of the accused.9  Subsequent cases have held that this
discovery right extends to material impeachment evidence, which is any
evidence material to the credibility of a witness.'0 This duty is uniformly
imposed on all prosecutors irrespective of whether the defendant requests
the evidence."
Two general characteristics of Brady are noteworthy. First, Brady due
process violations occur regardless of the good or bad faith of the
prosecutor.12 Second, Brady imposes an affirmative duty on prosecutors to
uncover and disclose all favorable evidence to the defendant. This includes
information "known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the
case, [such as] the police."13 In outlining these due process standards, the
Court highlighted the disparity between the parties to the case, reasoning
that only prosecutors "can know what is undisclosed."'4
In contrast to defendants going to trial, the Supreme Court has found
that defendants in the plea bargaining process have no constitutional right
to so-called "Brady evidence." In light of the Supreme Court's
9. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("We now hold that the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.").
10. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) (holding that material
impeachment evidence also falls within the general disclosure requirement set forth in Brady v.
Maryland); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (citing Giglio and Brady
to hold that distinguishing between the two types of evidence is improper because "[tihis Court
has rejected any such distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence");
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (explaining that in Bagley, "the Court disavowed any
difference between exculpatory and impeachment evidence for Brady purposes"); Brady, 373
U.S. at 87 (holding that suppression of material evidence "favorable to an accused" violates due
process).
11. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976) (explaining that there is no
distinction between situations involving a request for Brady evidence and situations with no
request at all).
12. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding explicitly that due process is violated "irrespective
of the good or bad faith of the prosecution"); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 ("If the suppression of
evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the
character of the prosecutor."); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38 ("But whether the prosecutor succeeds
or fails in meeting this obligation (whether, that is, a failure to disclose is in good faith or bad
faith . . .) the prosecution's responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising
to a material level of importance is inescapable.") (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).
13. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 ("This in turn means that the individual prosecutor has a duty to
learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the
case, including the police.").
14. Id. ("While the definition of Bagley materiality in terms of the cumulative effect of
suppression must accordingly be seen as leaving the government with a degree of discretion, it
must also be understood as imposing a corresponding burden . . . . the prosecution, which alone
can know what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely
net effect of all such evidence and make disclosure . . . .").
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classification of plea bargaining as a "critical stage"-requiring the
extension of Constitutional rights traditionally reserved for trial"-it was
surprising that the Supreme Court in 2002 narrowed, if not completely
barred, Brady v. Maryland's application to guilty pleas.16 In United States
v. Ruiz, a defendant declined a plea agreement because she did not want to
waive her right to receive Brady evidence, specifically impeachment
evidence. At sentencing, the defendant argued that the Brady waiver was
unconstitutional, and therefore, she was entitled to the downward
departures contained in the original plea agreement.'7 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit held that guilty pleas are constitutionally invalid where the
government fails to make the same disclosures of information that would
have been required had the defendant insisted upon a trial.'8 However, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that a prosecutor is not required to
disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a guilty plea for
that plea to be constitutionally valid.'9 Since Brady v. Maryland was
decided, the Supreme Court has refused to treat exculpatory evidence and
impeachment evidence differently for Brady purposes.20 Thus, when
15. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2010) ("The reality is that plea bargains
have become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel
have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the
adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at
critical stages .... In today's criminal justice system, therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain,
rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant."); Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012) ("The Sixth Amendment requires effective assistance of
counsel at critical stages of a criminal proceeding. Its protections are not designed simply to
protect the trial . . . . The constitutional guarantee applies to pre-trial critical stages that are part
of the whole course of a criminal proceeding, a proceeding in which defendants cannot be
presumed to make critical decisions without counsel's advice. This is consistent, too, with the
rule that defendants have a right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal, even though that
cannot in any way be characterized as part of the trial.").
16. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (holding that a failure to make pre-
guilty plea disclosures of material impeachment evidence is not a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment because "[impeachment evidence] is special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not
in respect to whether a plea is voluntary ('knowing,' 'intelligent,' and 'sufficient[ly] aware')").
17. Id at 625-26 (describing the facts of the case including the details of the plea
agreement declined by the defendant and the premise of the defendant's argument).
18. Id. at 629 ("In this case, the Ninth Circuit in effect held that a guilty plea is not
'voluntary' (and that the defendant could not, by pleading guilty, waive her right to a fair trial)
unless the prosecutors first made the same disclosure of material impeachment information that
the prosecutors would have had to make had the defendant insisted upon a trial.").
19. Id. at 633 (concluding that "the Constitution does not require the Government to
disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal
defendant").
20. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (citing Giglio and Brady
that distinguishing between the two types of evidence is improper, because "[t]his Court has
rejected any such distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence"); Kyles
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coupled with the body of cases equivocating impeachment and exculpatory
evidence, Ruiz effectively holds that plea agreements containing clauses
wherein a defendant waives his or her right to Brady disclosures, along
with any right to challenge the conviction based on such evidence, are
enforceable by the government. As a matter of stare decisis, Ruiz holds
that Brady v. Maryland's disclosure requirements do not apply in the guilty
plea context.21  Thus, the Supreme Court's decision not only deprives
criminal defendants of essential information at a "critical stage,"22 but also
eviscerates the legal weight of any exculpating information, including
outright governmental misconduct, which may be discovered by the
defendant after the plea is accepted.
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (explaining that in Bagley, "the Court disavowed any
difference between exculpatory and impeachment evidence for Brady purposes"); see also, e.g.,
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that suppression of material evidence,
"favorable to an accused," violates due process); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 at 154-55
(1972) (holding that material impeachment evidence also falls within the general disclosure
requirement set forth in Brady v. Maryland).
21. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952, 989-95 (2012)
(explaining that Ruiz's broader reasoning that guilty pleas are valid despite defendants' ignorance
of important facts, and the Court's holding that prosecutors are not required to disclose
information pertinent to affirmative defenses undercuts Brady's applicability to plea bargaining);
see also, e.g., Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 315 n.5 (4th Cir. 2002) (concluding that "[t]o the
extent that appellant contends that he would not have pled guilty had he been provided the
information held by the jailor, this claim is foreclosed by United States v. Ruiz"); United States v.
Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the argument that the Supreme Court's
ruling in Ruiz based upon impeachment evidence implied that exculpatory evidence is different
and must be turned over before entry of a plea); United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 285-
88 (2010) (stating that Ruiz foreclosed Brady's application to guilty pleas, citing both Jones and
Conroy); Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that Ruiz precluded
application of Brady to guilty pleas-contrary to the court's previous decisions); cf, e.g.,
McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that Ruiz denotes a
distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence, and therefore, "it is highly likely that
the Supreme Court would find a violation of the Due Process Clause if prosecutors . . . have
knowledge of a criminal defendant's factual innocence but fail to disclose such information to a
defendant before he enters into a guilty plea"); United States v. Ohiri, No. 03-2239, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 10677, at 562 (10th Cir. June 7, 2005) (interpreting a distinction between
impeachment and exculpatory evidence from the Ruiz decision, but ultimately holding that the
prosecutor should have already made Brady disclosures because the plea was entered the day jury
selection was slated to begin); United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 465, 469 (4th Cir. 2013)
(holding that prosecutors are required to make Brady disclosures prior to entering guilty pleas,
despite Ruiz, without overruling or providing any reference to contrary Fourth Circuit precedent
set in Jones and Moussaoui).
22. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385-86 (2012) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining because the protection extends to
"pre-trial critical stages of a criminal proceeding"); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405
(2010) (holding that plea bargaining is a "critical stage" of criminal proceedings, and thus, the
Sixth Amendment requires effective assistance of counsel).
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This due process limitation is significant because there are many
indications that innocent individuals plead guilty.2 3  The University of
Michigan's National Registry of Exonerations contains 276 individuals
who pled guilty and were later exonerated.24 These cases represent nearly
sixteen percent of the 1,778 exonerations listed in the registry.25 The
Innocence Project estimates that twenty-five percent of all wrongful
convictions in the United States involve guilty pleas.26
The Supreme Court's decision in Ruiz not only deprives criminal
defendants of essential information at a "critical stage,"2 7 but also
eviscerates the legal weight of any exculpating information, including
outright governmental misconduct, which may be discovered by the
defendant after their plea is accepted.28 Thus, innocent defendants pleading
guilty are in a uniquely helpless position. As stated, this Note addresses the
issue of innocent defendants pleading guilty despite the existence of
evidence suggesting their innocence, specifically in cases involving
misconduct by government agents. Part I of this Note will highlight the
prevalence of innocent defendants pleading guilty. This section will focus
on the exploitation of vulnerable defendants and will highlight instances
where the government either knew, or had reason to know, that the accused
was likely innocent. Part II will explain why the judiciary is not equipped
to address this problem. Finally, Part M will explain why the legislature is
the proper body to generate a remedy and provide recommendations as to
what actions might be viable.
23. See generally John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually
Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (2014) (describing known
instances of innocent defendants pleading guilty, and highlighting that many cases go unnoticed);
see also When the Innocent Plead Guilty, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT (Jan. 26, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/news-events-exonerations/when-the-innocent-plead-guilty
(describing the cases of thirty-one individuals who were convicted under guilty pleas, but were
later exonerated); THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx# (last visited Mar. 25, 2016) ; Samuel R.
Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANNu. REV. L. Soc. SCi. 173, 181 (2008) (discussing a study of
340 defendants, where 6% who were exonerated pled guilty).
24. See THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note, at 23.
25. Id
26. See False Confessions or Admissions, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/causes/false-confessions-admissions (estimating that false confessions are
involved in about twenty-five percent of wrongful convictions later overturned by DNA
evidence).
27. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385-86 (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires effective
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining because the protection extends to "pre-trial critical
stages of a criminal proceeding"); Missouri, 132 S. Ct. at 1405 (holding that plea bargaining is a
"critical stage" of criminal proceedings, and thus, the Sixth Amendment requires effective
assistance of counsel).
28. See supra note 21.
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It is important to note at the outset that the goal of this Note is not to
attack the merits of the guilty plea system as a whole-that debate is left to
other scholars.29 The author recognizes that criminal defendants seeking
more lenient treatment are justified in pursuing guilty pleas rather than
gambling on a trial.30  Moreover, this Note does not suggest that
prosecutors generally ignore their moral obligation to avoid depriving
innocent individuals of their liberty. In fact, the author recognizes that
prosecutors are assumed to have complied with their moral duty to protect
American citizens. Furthermore, this Note does not seek to argue that all
law enforcement investigate with a malicious intent to create false
convictions. Rather, this Note seeks only to highlight an unfortunate
paradox of the American guilty plea system, where incentivizing judicial
efficiency has enabled ill-intentioned or careless convictions of innocent
individuals to pass unchecked, and often, without recourse.
I. Innocent Individuals Plead Guilty, And In Some Instances,
Their Innocence is Either Known or Demonstrated by Evidence
Available to The Government
In today's criminal justice system, individuals plead guilty to crimes
they did not commit.3 1  Institutions such as the Innocence Project and
University of Michigan's National Registry of Exonerations maintain
extensive public databases devoted to tracking and reporting cases where
individuals entered guilty pleas and were later exonerated after proving
their innocence.3 2 Scholars have argued that the unfairness of the guilty
29. See Susan R. Klein, Aleza S. Remis & Donna Lee Elm, Waiving the Criminal Justice
System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 73, 77 n.22 (2014)
(comparing Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 652,
660-661 (1981) (contending that plea bargaining remains an inherently unfair and irrational
process), Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2467-68 (2004) (arguing that the plea bargaining process require many reforms), Darryl K.
Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93
CALIF. L. REv. 1585, 1610-11 (2005) (arguing that the plea bargaining process favors conflict
resolution over truth-finding and accuracy), and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining As
Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1980 (1992) (concluding that plea bargaining should be
abolished), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969,
1972 (1992) (arguing that the plea bargaining process is just as effective as trial at separating the
guilty from the innocent), and Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of
Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 CoLUM. L. REv. 1010, 1013 (2005) (concluding that
sentencing commissions may be successful in regulating prosecutorial authority)).
30. See Alschuler, supra note 29, at 653 n.2 (citing empirical studies which indicate that
pleading defendants receive more lenient punishments than similar defendants who pursued
trials).
31. See supra notes 23-26.
32. See id.
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plea process is manifested in these cases.33 Some argue that the system's
unfairness is further defined in part by an asymmetry of information
between the government and the criminal defendant, especially with
respect to exculpatory and impeachment evidence.34 Ultimately, the
information disparity between the two parties is part of a broader issue-
the government using coercive tactics to obtain false convictions despite
having evidence that demonstrates the defendant's actual innocence.35
A. False Guilty Pleas Are Not Uncommon
Evidence suggests that innocent defendants plead guilty with startling
frequency.3 6  In fact, the Innocence Project estimates that one in four
wrongful convictions, which are later overturned by DNA evidence,
involve false confessions.37 In 2009, the Innocence Project published a list
of thirty-one individuals who were exonerated after pleading guilty to
crimes they did not commit.3 8 For example, Phillip Bivens, Bobby Ray
Dixon, and Larry Ruffin received life sentences for a 1979 rape and murder
they did not commit.39  Threatened with the death penalty, Bivens and
Dixon pleaded guilty and testified against Ruffin. However, in 2010, all
33. See Blume & Helm, supra note 23, at 166-70 (arguing that the plea bargaining process
favors the prosecution); see also id at 167 n.60 (noting how plea bargaining has given
prosecutors more power, rather than judges); see Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion:
The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 84 (2005); William J. Stuntz,
Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2548, 2549
(2004) (describing the criminal law as a "menu" of options that prosecutors can use to dictate the
terms of plea bargains); Ana Maria Gutidrrez, The Sixth Amendment: The Operation of Plea
Bargaining in Contemporary Criminal Procedure, 87 DENV. U. L. REv. 695, 715-18 (2010)
(arguing that the prosecution's unbridled authority to determine the charges levied against
defendants puts the government in an insurmountable position of superior bargaining power, and
has an unfair, coercive effect on plea negotiations).
34. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGS L.J., 957, 958 (1989); see also Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Plea Bargaining in the
Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM
L. REv. 3599 (2013); Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatists
Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REv., 2011, 2037 (2000).
35. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972).
36. See supra notes 23-26.
37. See False Confessions or Admissions, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/causes/false-confessions-admissions (estimating that false confessions are
involved in about twenty-five percent of wrongful convictions later overturned by DNA
evidence).





three were exonerated by DNA evidence. Unfortunately, both Dixon and
Ruffm died before their names were cleared.4 0  Another exonerated
individual, John Dixon, also pled guilty to a rape he did not commit.41
Initially, John asked to withdraw his plea and pursue a trial, but the court
denied his request, and he was sentenced to forty-five years in prison.42
John served ten years of his sentence before DNA evidence proved his
innocence.4 3 Similarly, Rodney Roberts pled guilty to kidnapping after
police stated that a rape victim identified Roberts in a photo lineup.4
However, when the case was remanded in 2007, the victim denied that she
had picked any suspect from a lineup.45 In 2013, DNA testing excluded
Roberts from the crime, and he was released a year later.4 6 In total, the
group of thirty-one individuals identified by the Innocence Project served
over a century and a half in prison before they were exonerated.47  The
Innocence Project is not the only source documenting empirical evidence
of innocent individuals pleading guilty. The National Registry of
Exonerations also lists over 200 individuals who pled guilty to crimes and
were later exonerated.48
B. In Some Instances, False Guilty Pleas Are Produced by Nefarious
Governmental Conduct, or Made Even When the Government Knows
or Suspects That the Accused Is Innocent
Many have argued that the plea bargaining process is coercive and
unfairly favors the government.49 Yet, many governmental tactics,
although scrutinized for their coercive effects, are sanctioned by the










48. See THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 23.
49. See supra, note 29.
50. For example, prosecutors are afforded wide latitude to induce guilty pleas by charging
one criminal act under multiple overlapping criminal statutes. Gutidrrez, supra note 33. Such
activity falls within the permissible bounds of the Constitution, because "the Executive Branch
has exclusive authority and absolute discretion" to select its charges. Greenlaw v. United States,
554 U.S. 237, 247 (2008) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)). This
authority enables prosecutors to invoke "overly broad and weighty charges that would not have
arisen, but for the possibility of procuring a guilty plea." Guti6rrez, supra note 33. In this
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defendants as a reward for waiving their constitutional rights and pleading
guilty." Nevertheless, the goal of this Note is not to weigh the merits of
the guilty plea system,52 but to highlight the prominence of governmental
coercion used to obtain false convictions despite evidence suggesting
inaccuracy or innocence.
The case of the "West Memphis Three" illustrates the prevalence of
this problem. This case centered on the murder of three young boys whose
bodies were discovered naked and hogtied with their own shoelaces in
1993.53 The three defendants, Misskelley, Echols, and Baldwin-the
"West Memphis Three"-were arrested and convicted in connection with
the murders; however, post-trial revelations of the highly suspicious
circumstances surrounding the convictions led the Arkansas Supreme Court
to order the trial court to reconsider their convictions in 2010.54
Following the trials, evidence emerged detailing suspicious
weaknesses in the government's case, including evidence of outright
governmental misconduct. In fact, the case against the defendants was so
questionable that HBO released a three-part film documenting the
inaccuracy of their convictions. No DNA evidence from the three
defendants was ever found at the scene, nor any physical evidence linking
the defendants to the murders. Moreover, the government's principal
witness, who provided the testimony that catalyzed the case against the
manner, prosecutors are free to parade vastly more lenient sentences before criminal defendants
as a reward for waiving their constitutional rights and pleading guilty-a coercive technique
repeatedly recognized as permissible by the Supreme Court. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513
U.S. 196, 210 (1995) (citing Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978)) (reasoning that
"[t]he plea bargaining process necessarily exerts pressure on defendants to plead guilty and to
abandon a series of fundamental rights, but we have repeatedly held that the government 'may
encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the plea."'). This inherent
disparity in plea bargaining power has been referred to by scholars as the "Overcharging
Dynamic." Guti6trez, supra note 33.
51. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210 (explaining "[w]hile confronting a defendant with the risk
of more severe punishment clearly may have a discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of
his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable-and permissible-
attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas")
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
52. See Klein et al., supra note 29.
53. See Who Are the West Memphis Three?, ARK. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.
arktimes.con/arkansas/who-are-the-west-memphis- three/Content?oid= 1886216.
54. Id.
55. See PARADISE LOST: THE MURDERS AT ROBIN HOOD HILLS (Home Box Office 1996)
(documenting the story of the "West Memphis Three" and their likely innocence); see also
PARADISE LoST 2: REVELATIONS (Home Box Office 2000) (chronicling the development of the
case); PARADISE LOST 3: PURGATORY (Home Box Office 2011) (documenting the end of the
appeal process for the three defendants).
56. Id.
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three defendants, later claimed that her statements were fabricated due to
coercion by the police." This witness also alleged that she knew of at least
one piece of evidence destroyed by the government during the
investigation.58 Additionally, this witness's son, who was eight at the time
and friends with the victims, later stated that the police "tricked" him into
making false statements.59 Evidence also suggested that the government
coerced a confession from the defendant, Misskelley-who had an IQ of
seventy-five0-- during a twelve hour interrogation, then leaked that
confession to the public after the trial court separated the trials and ruled
the confession inadmissible against the other defendants.6 2 Although the
Misskelley confession incorrectly stated several key details and was later
recanted,63 jurists nonetheless admitted to relying on the statement in
convicting the defendants."
Ultimately, Misskelley was sentenced to life imprisonment plus forty
years,65 Echols was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole, and Baldwin, characterized as the ringleader, was sentenced to
death by lethal injection.6 6 Yet, in 2007, new evidence surfaced-DNA
testing revealed that a hair found in one of the knots likely belonged to the
stepfather of one of the victims, 67 and the government's key witness
recanted her testimony, leading the Arkansas Supreme Court to order that




60. See Who are the West Memphis Three?, supra note 53 (referring to Jessie Misskelley,
Jr. as "mentally challenged"); see also Shaila Dewan, Defense Offers New Evidence in a Murder
Case that Shocked Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/10/30/us/30satanic.html?_r--0 (calling Misskelley "mildly retarded").
61. See Blume & Helm, supra note 23, at 159 (noting that the confession also implicated
the other two defendants and was later recanted).
62. See Dewan, supra note 60.
63. Notably, Misskelley had been incorrect about several key details in his confession, such
as time of the crime, the way the victims were tied, and their manner of deaths. See Dewan,
supra note 60.
64. See Blume & Helm, supra note 23, at 160 n.16; see also Dewan, supra note 60.
65. Youth Is Convicted in Slaying of 3 Boys in an Arkansas City, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5,
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/05/us/youth-is-convicted-in-slaying-of-3-boys-in-an-
arkansas-city.html; Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 707 (Ark. 1996) ("The statements [of
Misskelley's confession] were the strongest evidence offered against the appellant at trial. In
fact, they were virtually the only evidence, all other testimony and exhibits serving primarily as
corroboration.").
66. Id.
67. Id (pointing out that this individual was the stepfather of the most badly mutilated
victim and that the hair was found in a knot of a victim other than the individual's stepson).
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the convictions be reconsidered.68 However, before the trial commenced,
the prosecution offered the three men plea deals,69 which allowed them to
plead-despite maintaining their innocence-because it was in their own
70best interests. In this instance, the defendants received sentences for
timeserved and would be released, if all three agreed to the terms
unanimously.7 '
The trial outlook was bright for the "West Memphis Three," and even
the prosecutor admitted that the defendants would likely be acquitted if the
case went to trial.72 However, refusing to take the deal would leave Echols
on death row-a result that Baldwin explained was unacceptable.73 All
three defendants agreed to take the deal.74 In the end, the "West Memphis
Three" pled guilty to crimes they adamantly denied committing, and which
the weight of evidence suggested they did not commit.75
C. Guilty Pleas Produced by Government Misconduct Represent an
Especially Troublesome Legal Niche, Where False Convictions
Stand Free From Traditional Constitutional Oversight
The case of the "West Memphis Three" is a beacon, illuminating the
problems that arise at the intersection of governmental misconduct and
guilty plea doctrines. Though the prosecutor later admitted that he believed
the defendants would be acquitted at trial76 and ample evidence indicated
the innocence of the three men 7 7 as well as governmental misconduct, he
offered a plea agreement designed to force the defendants into
acceptance.78  Nevertheless, because these defendants were initially
convicted at trial, they maintained their right to attack the validity of those
trial convictions. As this Note will further discuss, innocent defendants
68. Echols v. State, 373 S.W.3d 892, 902 (Ark. 2010).





73. Id. (quoting Baldwin as stating, "This was not justice .... However, they're trying to
kill Damien.").
74. Id
75. See PARADISE LOST: THE MURDERS AT ROBIN HOOD HILLS (Home Box Office 1996)
(documenting the story of the "West Memphis Three" and their likely innocence); see also
PARADISE LOST 2: REVELATIONS (Home Box Office 2000) (chronicling the development of the
case); PARADISE LOST 3: PURGATORY (Home Box Office 2011) (documenting the end of the
appeal process for the three defendants).




who forgo trial and plead guilty are commonly left with no opportunities
for recourse despite the availability of exculpating evidence.
While an extreme circumstance, the case of the "West Memphis
Three" is not a factual outlier. Instances of wrongful convictions,
especially those involving governmental misconduct, have been popular
subjects for documentary films and television shows,79 and relevant case
law is also readily available. In Ferrera v. United States, the First Circuit
overturned a guilty plea conviction because the government: (1) promised
immunity from prosecution to coerce an individual to provide false and
incriminating testimony against a defendant; and *(2) actively withheld
evidence of that witness' clear recantation, which excluded the defendant
from the crime, and moved the defendant to accept a plea agreement.80 In
fact, heavy sentencing and capital punishment are frequently used to coerce
defendants into both pleading guilty and providing false testimony against
others despite their innocence.81 The information disparity between the
government and the accused leaves defendants in a vulnerable position
during plea negotiations, as defendants' decisions are largely premised on
their assessment of the prosecution's case, rather than any individual
perception of guilt or innocence.
79. See, e.g., CAPTURING THE FRIEDMANS (Magnolia Pictures 2003) (documenting
Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2010), in which, a defendant plead guilty after: (1) the
prosecutor continuously added more counts to the indictment; (2) a public leak of specific
allegations against the defendant created an especially hostile trial environment; and (3) the judge
explicitly stated her belief that the defendant was guilty; and in which a post-conviction
documentary revealed: (1) questionable investigatory practices, such as hypnotizing child
witnesses to obtain statements against the defendant; (2) outright prosecutorial misconduct, such
as lying to child witnesses to procure statements against the defendant; and (3) an obvious lack of
sufficient evidence to support the government's case against the defendant); see generally,
MAKING A MURDER (Nefflix Dec. 18, 2003) (documenting another case of governmental
misconduct-though unrelated to the guilty plea issue).
80. Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278 at 291-92 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining "the
government manipulated the witness (Jordan) into reverting back to his original version of events,
then effectively represented to the court and the defense that the witness was going to confirm the
story (now known by the prosecution to be a manipulated tale) that the petitioner was responsible
for [the murder].").
81. See e.g., Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2010) (involving a defendant who
pled guilty, despite maintaining his innocence, because the prosecutor continuously added
hundreds of allegations to the indictment; most, if not all, of which were later revealed to have a
higher probability of falsity than truth); see also, When the Innocent Plead Guilty, supra note 23
(describing the case of Bivens, Dixon, and Ruffin, in which two defendants pleaded guilty and
testified against the third but were all later exonerated by DNA evidence; as well as the case of
Winslow, White, Taylor, Sheldon, Gonzalez, and Dean, in which four of six defendants gave
false confessions and testified against the lone defendant that did not plead guilty but all six were
later exonerated by DNA evidence); see also id (listing numerous instances involving threats of
capital punishment).
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It is circular to state that the defendant, above all others, should know
of his or her own innocence, because in the American criminal justice
system the accused bears no burden of proof. Rather, the prosecution bears
the weight of demonstrating the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
This alone should mandate the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable
to the accused during the guilty plea process. However, as will be
discussed below, the traditional trial-centric approach to due process is ill-
suited to cope with modem guilty plea doctrines. In fact, guilty pleas have
effectively rendered the reasonable doubt standard moot because they
require defendants to demonstrate their innocence outside of the courtroom
to prosecutors looking to prey on uninformed defendants relying on
similarly uninformed defense counsel for guidance.
III. The Supreme Court Attempted to Counteract Governmental
Misconduct by Mandating Evidentiary Disclosure Requirements
in Brady v. Maryland, But Brady Doctrine Remedies Are
Insufficient for Application to Guilty Plea Convictions
As the architect of a criminal proceeding, the government has a
propensity to leverage its unilateral access to information and abuse its
position in order to obtain false convictions.82 Brady v. Maryland and its
progeny, which mandated evidentiary disclosure requirements in order to
neutralize the effect of governmental misconduct in obtaining convictions,
epitomize the rampant nature of this problem.8 3 These cases require the
82. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963) (ordering a new trial due to
prosecutorial suppression of a statement in which a separate defendant admitted to committing the
charged murder, and holding that voluntary suppression of evidence favoring the accused and
material to guilt or punishment violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) (ordering a new trial due to suppression of the government's promise to
avoid prosecuting its key witness, who was intimately involved in the charged crime, if he
cooperated with the government and holding that impeachment evidence falls under the
disclosure requirements of Brady v. Maryland); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676
(1985) (ordering a new trial due to the suppression of payments made to key governmental
witnesses in exchange for trial testimony against the defendant); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
433 (1995) (ordering a new trial due to governmental suppression of numerous items of evidence,
including eyewitness testimony, multiple inconsistent statements by the government's key
witness, and a list of cars inconsistent with the government's theory-all of which cumulatively
could have indicated: (1) that the defendant was not responsible for the crime; and (2) that the
government's key witness had himself committed the crime).
83. Id; see, e.g., Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2010) (involving interviews
made by children who later claimed they were pressured to give false testimony); Ferrara, 456
F.3d at 291-92 (involving governmental suppression of a key witness' recantation, which
excluded the defendant from the crime); Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2007)
(involving a situation where the government falsified the polygraph test results of a co-defendant
to induce a no-contest plea by the named defendant, and later, precluded the co-defendant from
testifying against the government by threatening him with additional prosecution).
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government to disclose all evidence favorable to the accused, which is
material either to punishment or guilt (i.e., material exculpatory evidence
and material impeachment evidence) prior to trial.84 These requirements
follow from the Court's longstanding prohibition against the willful use of
false evidence and are rooted in the constitutional guarantee of due
85
process. However, the Brady Doctrine was developed explicitly under
the trial context and fails to address the problems created when defendants
plead guilty before entering trial. Additionally, even if Brady v. Maryland
applies to guilty pleas, prosecutors have nearly dismantled the force of the
Brady Doctrine in this context, by conditioning guilty pleas on the
defendant's agreement to waive his or her rights to challenge the resulting
conviction.
A. The Evidentiary Disclosure Requirements Enumerated in Brady v.
Maryland and Its Progeny Were Designed to Balance the Inherent
Power Disparity in Criminal Proceedings, which Otherwise Favors
the Government as the Sole Possessor of Evidence Against the
Accused
In the preeminent case Brady v. Maryland, the Court was asked to
determine whether a prosecutor's voluntary suppression of a confession,
despite defense counsel's pretrial request for exculpatory evidence, violated
a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. 6 Defense
counsel for the defendant, Brady, asked the prosecutor to examine the
extrajudicial statements of another defendant, Boblit, before entering trial.87
The prosecutor provided several documents, but withheld a statement in
which Boblit admitted to committing the actual homicide.8 8  The
suppressed confession only came to light after Brady was tried, convicted,
and sentenced.89 The Court held that "suppression of evidence favorable to
an accused, upon request, violates due process where the evidence is
material90 either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good or bad
84. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
85. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (explaining that the Court's decision was an extension of Mooney
v. Holohan, which proscribed the knowing use of perjured testimony; and Pyle v. Kansas, which
further prohibited knowing suppression of evidence favorable to the accused).
86. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
87. Id.
88. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963).
89. Id.
90. As explained by the Court, "material" means a reasonable probability that disclosure
would have changed the result of the proceeding. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682
(1985).
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faith of the prosecution."9' This rule aligned with the Court's holding that
convictions obtained through the use of perjured testimony were
fundamentally unfair.92
Since Brady v. Maryland, the Court has expanded the scope of this
disclosure requirement to include material impeachment evidence.93 The
Court has also held this requirement to apply with equal force whether the
defense made a request for the material evidence or not.94 Impeachment
evidence relates to the credibility of a witness and is best illustrated in
Giglio v. United States.95 In Giglio, the government suppressed an alleged
promise made to the prosecution's key witness, which provided for the
witness's immunity in exchange for testimony at trial. 9 6 The controversial
witness ("Taliento") was the alleged co-conspirator and, in fact, was the
sole witness connecting the defendant to the charged crime.97 The witness
testified that no arrangements with the prosecution existed and the
government attorney stated that Taliento "received no promises that he
would not be indicted."98 However, the defense later discovered that at
least one governmental officer, an Assistant United States Attorney,
promised the witness immunity in exchange for cooperation with the
government.99 The Court held the suppression of such a promise violated
the defendant's right to due process because the witness's credibility was a
pivotal issue in the case.'00 In fact, the government relied so heavily on
Taliento's testimony that failure to disclose the promise violated the
"rudimentary demands of justice" as a willful deception of the court.'0 ' As
in Brady v. Maryland, the Court in Giglio rooted its holding in the general
bar of presenting false evidence.10 2 The Court considered disclosures of
91. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
92. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
93. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 97; Bagley, 473
U.S. at 667; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
94. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (relying on Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 674 (1984)); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (citing Bagley as an abandonment
of allocating weight to requests for Brady material).
95. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150-51.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 154-55.
98. Id. at 152 (internal quotations omitted).
99. Id. at 153.
100. Id at 151.
101. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972) (internal quotations omitted)
(summarizing Mooney v. Holohanas holding, "deliberate deception of the court and juror's by the
presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with 'rudimentary demands ofjustice;' and
further citing, Napue v. Illinois as an expansion of the rule established in Mooney).
102. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-55.
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material impeachment evidence, like disclosures of material exculpatory
evidence, to be indispensable to the integrity of trials and thus held that
such evidence falls within the scope of Brady v. Maryland.10 3
Ultimately, Brady v. Maryland and its progeny evince the
government's lengthy history of abusing its position as the "architect" of
criminal proceedings and abandoning its duty to administer justice in favor
of obtaining convictions unconstitutionally.' The Brady disclosure
requirements are the Court's reaction to the government's propensity for
violating the due process rights of accused individuals as well as an
ongoing attempt to maintain the integrity of the American criminal justice
system. According to the Court, American prosecutors play a special role
in the search for truth in criminal trials.'0 The requirement of disclosure is
imperative because prosecutors serve as "the representative . . . of a
sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."06
Similarly, ethical authorities also impose strict standards which
command disclosure of Brady evidence.0 7  Under the American Bar
Association's Model Rules for Professional Conduct, prosecutors are
prohibited from prosecuting a charge they know to be unsupported and
must make "timely" disclosures of evidence that "tends to negate the guilt
of the accused or mitigates the offense."'08  Likewise, in 2010, the
Department of Justice's ("DOJ") United States Attorneys 'Manual, required
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory information to defendants "reasonably
promptly" after discovery.'09 Yet, while ethical authorities like the ABA
and the DOJ may require prosecutors to disclose evidence tending to
exculpate accused individuals, neither the Model Rules for Professional
Conduct nor the DOJ's United States Attorneys' Manual explicitly require
103. Id.
104. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963)("The principle ... is not
punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system
of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on
the walls of the Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain: 'The
United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts."'); see also
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) (justifying the disclosure obligation of prosecutors
"the special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials").
105. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281.
106. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935)).
107. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015); U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-165 (2010).
108. See MODEL RULES, supra note 107.
109. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 107.
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disclosure of such evidence prior to entering a guilty plea.o10 Regardless of
their requirements, these rules are nonetheless inconsequential as they fail
to provide a remedy for defendants affected by such nondisclosures.
B. Under the Supreme Court's Construction of Guilty Plea Validity, the
Brady Doctrine Fails to Provide a Remedy for Innocent Defendants
that Plead Guilty
Guilty pleas and waivers of rights cannot be invalidated where a
criminal defendant enters the agreement knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently."' The Constitution shields individuals from admitting guilt
by guaranteeing the right to avoid self-incrimination and the right to a jury
trial.1 12  However, in today's criminal justice system, many defendants
choose to waive these rights and plead guilty.1 13  Waivers of
constitutionally mandated rights are central to guilty pleas, and the
Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the criminal defendant's right to do
so.114 However, this ability is not without bounds.'15  The Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to due process and
requires that a defendant's waiver of constitutional rights be a "knowing,
intelligent acts done, feely given, with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences."' 1 6 The weight of these principles
was reaffirmed in Hill v. Lockhart, which held that "the longstanding test
for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action
open to the defendant.""7 Guilty pleas and waivers of rights are invalid
where they have been extracted by threats, violence, misrepresentation, or
improper influence."8  Such activity deprives the act of its voluntary
character."'9 Under these narrow circumstances, criminal defendants may
challenge the validity of their pleas and waivers of rights based on
information not available at the time of the plea.120 In Brady v. United
States, the Court emphasized that these challenges cannot succeed absent
110. See MODEL RULES, supra note 107.
111. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
112. U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI.
113. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
114. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200-01 (1995); United States v. Ruiz,
536 U.S. 629 (2002) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)).
115. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
116. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
117. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985).
118. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
119. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962)
120. Id.
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impermissible conduct by governmental agents.12' Like jury verdicts,
guilty pleas are conclusive and their finality cannot be challenged outside
of this context.122  Criminal defendants are not entitled to rescind their
admissions of guilt merely because they have misapprehended the quality
of the State's case.123
1. Brady Disclosures Are Irrelevant to Guilty Pleas Because Irrespective of
Any Disclosure or Suppression such Evidence Cannot Affect the Validity
of a Guilty Plea
Unfortunately for innocent defendants, the Court's construction of
valid guilty pleas is extremely basic and, by design, leaves little
opportunity for subsequent challenges.12 4 Valid pleas are comprised of two
elements: (1) voluntariness and (2) intelligence.12 5 The first requirement,
"voluntariness," is defined by the Supreme Court as being "fully aware of
the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel." 2 6 The second
element, "intelligence," is presumed where the defendant pleads guilty
under the advice of counsel and is competent "or otherwise . . . in control
of his mental faculties." 27  Over time, these elements have surfaced in
several different forms and are commonly referred to as the "knowing and
voluntary" standard.128 Ultimately, the test only requires that the pleading
defendant understand the nature of the charges against him or her and the
consequences of his or her plea.12 9
Under this standard, Brady evidence is wholly irrelevant to the
assessment of a guilty plea's validity. Although some circuit courts have
121. Brady, 397 U.S. at 757.
122. Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 493
123. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970).
124. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (outlining a procedure where the defendant expressly lays the
foundations for plea validity in their plea colloquy); see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,
1406 (2010) (interpreting Rule 11 as protecting guilty pleas against claims of invalidity by
requiring judges to extensively develop the record with testimony demonstrating that the elements
of a valid plea are met); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (interpreting Rule
11 as designed to preclude challenges by pleading defendants at the outset).
125. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985).
126. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755.
127. Id. at 756.
128. Initially, the Supreme Court included the term "knowing" as an element of validity. See
Brady- 397 U.S. at 755. However, in the cases that followed, "knowing" was interpreted as
falling within the scope of "voluntariness." See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56.
129. Hill, 474 U.S. at 61.
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held that due process requires Brady disclosures during plea bargaining,13 0
in 2002, the Supreme Court severely limited the scope of Brady v.
Maryland in United States v. Ruiz.' 3 ' In Ruiz, the Court considered
whether, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, federal prosecutors are
required to disclose material impeachment information before entering into
a binding plea agreement with a criminal defendant.132 The Supreme Court
held that prosecutors are not required to disclose material impeachment
evidence prior to entering a guilty plea; any failure to do so cannot affect
the validity of a guilty plea.3 3 The Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit's
determination that a guilty plea could not be valid where the prosecutor
fails to make the same disclosures of material impeachment evidence,
which would otherwise be required had the defendant insisted on trial,
implicitly holds that guilty pleas do not require the same disclosures as a
trial to avoid violating the defendant's due process right.134
Consequently, the Ruiz decision eradicates any possibility of
extending Brady disclosures to the guilty plea context. Under Ruiz, Brady
evidence is wholly irrelevant to the question of whether the defendant's
guilty plea was "valid." In Ruiz, the Supreme Court held that material
impeachment evidence is "special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not
in respect to whether a plea is sufficiently voluntary (knowing, intelligent,
130. Some circuit courts responded to instances where suppression of Brady evidence
coerced defendants into pleading guilty by holding that the Brady doctrine applied to plea
bargaining. See, e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998); United States
v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365, 1375 (7th Cir. 1995); Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 1992);
White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1988); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448,
1453 (9th Cir. 1995); Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 291-92 (1st Cir. 2006); Wilkins v.
United States, 754 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2014); Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1148 (9th Cir.
2007); United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 465, 469 (4th Cir. 2013). However, most of these
cases were decided pre-Ruiz, and only a few circuits have held this way post-Ruiz. Compare
Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that Ruiz precluded application of Brady
v. Maryland to guilty pleas-contrary to the court's previous decisions, Avellino and Tate), with
United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 465, 469 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding post-Ruiz that failure to
disclose Brady evidence during plea bargaining violated due process, without addressing the
court's previous decision, United States v. Moussaoui, which held that Ruiz precluded the
application of Brady). Nonetheless, holdings in favor of applying the Brady doctrine have been
the focal point of academic support. See Eric Hawkins, A Murky Doctrine Gets a Little
Pushback: The Fourth Circuit's Rebuff of Guilty Pleas in United States v. Fisher, 55 B.C. L. REv.
103 (2014).
131. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 629, 631 (2002).
.132. Id. at 625.
133. Id. at 629-32.
134. Id. at 629 (describing the Ninth Circuit's decision as holding "that a guilty plea is not
'voluntary' (and that the defendant could not, by pleading guilty, waive her right to a fair trial)
unless the prosecutors first made the same disclosure of material impeachment information that
they would have had to make had the defendant insisted upon a trial").
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and sufficiently aware)."135  The Supreme Court has consistently
disavowed any distinction between material impeachment evidence and
material exculpatory evidence.'36 Rather, these categories of evidence are
to be treated the same for Brady purposes.137 Thus, in light of the Court's
precedent, the Ruiz decision applies broadly and holds that neither material
impeachment evidence nor material exculpatory evidence can affect the
validity (voluntary, knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware nature) of a
guilty plea. In fact, "it has always been the [Supreme] Court's view that
the notice component of due process refers to the charge rather than the
evidentiary support for the charge."'3 8  This distinction is imperative
because it establishes that evidence cannot affect the voluntary and
intelligent nature of a plea.
2. Once Entered, Guilty Pleas Carry a Strong Presumption of Validity,
which Can Only Be Overcome Under Narrowly Defined Circumstances-
None Arise Under the Brady Doctrine
The Supreme Court holds that guilty pleas do not require defendants'
complete knowledge of the relevant circumstances to be valid; rather, the
Constitution permits acceptance of guilty pleas (including their subsequent
waivers of rights) despite any misconceptions the defendants might have.3 9
Pleading defendants are not entitled to withdraw their plea simply because
they have misapprehended the quality of the state's case.14 0 Conversely,
modem guilty pleas and their subsequent waivers of rights are
presumptively valid.141 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
("Rule 11") requires judges to address defendants personally and
thoroughly vet each plea before acceptance.142 As a result, the fundamental
elements of validity are established on the record before the plea is
entered.143 Judges thereby establish the defendant's understanding of the
135. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (rejecting distinctions between
impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433
(1995) (citing Bagley for the same proposition); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154
(1972).
137. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676.
138. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 n.20 (1976) (emphasis added).
139. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630-31 (2002) (citing a litany of
misunderstandings accepted by the Supreme Court).
140. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970).
141. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459, 466 (1969).
142. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 465-66.
143. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406; McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466.
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relevant rights and consequences at the outset.'" As such, the Supreme
Court recognizes that plea entry proceedings provide substantial protection
against later claims seeking invalidation by establishing validity on the
record.145 Absent threats, misrepresentation, improper promises, or undue
influence, guilty pleas and their accompanying waivers of rights must
stand.' Such activity would deprive the plea of its voluntary character,
and, under these narrow circumstances, criminal defendants may
collaterally attack the validity of their guilty pleas.14 7 Notably, failure to
disclose Brady evidence does not square with any of the Court's
specifically defined instances where invalidation is proper.
Nevertheless, some Circuit courts have expanded Brady v. Maryland's
disclosure requirements by testing the validity of pleas based on whether a
defendant would have insisted on going to trial had Brady evidence been
disclosed.14 8 However, the longstanding standard for voluntariness requires
only that a pleading defendant be fully aware of the direct consequences,
including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel.149  Because these circuit courts fail to
assess the validity of guilty pleas in light of this standard, reliance on such
decisions is improper.
C. Waivers of Rights Play a Unique and Essential Role in the Guilty Plea
System; But, Today, Waivers of Rights Are Designed to Frustrate
Attempts to Provide Recourse to Innocent Defendants
The essential limitation of Brady v. Maryland is that Brady's
disclosure protections were developed specifically as trial rights. Thus,
while the Supreme Court has recognized that the government alone is in the
unique position of knowing the full extent of the evidence at play in each
case, which in turn establishes an affirmative duty on the prosecution to
discover and disclose material evidence favorable to the accused,5 o the
144. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466.
145. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 at 1406.
146. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753-55 (1970).
147. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
148. See, e.g., Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 291-92 (1st Cir. 2006); Wilkins v.
United States; 754 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2014); Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1148 (9th Cir.
2007); United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 465-69 (4th Cir. 2013).
149. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 755.
150. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) ("But the prosecution, which alone can
know what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net
effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of 'reasonable probability' is
reached. This in turn means that the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable
evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the
police."); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (explaining that the
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applicability of Brady v. Maryland and its progeny to plea bargaining,
while unsettled, appears unlikely.'5 ' These decisions stemmed explicitly
from the Court's desire to ensure the fairness and reliability of trials.152
Potential harm to the sanctity of jury trials factored deeply into the Court's
decisions1 53 and, in the end, guilty pleas are vastly different than jury
trials. 5 4  In fact, the act of pleading guilty not only waives the criminal
defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial, but it also waives the
defendant's right to confront accusers and avoid self-incrimination. ' As
such, the act of waiving rights is an inseparable element of guilty pleas.
prosecution's duty, as spokesperson of the state, is to know of all information pertinent to their
case, assess such information, and make proper disclosures to the defense).
151. See Klein et al., supra note 29, at 110 n.214 (arguing that there is much disagreement
over Brady v. Maryland's application to guilty pleas); see also, ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof'1
Resp., Formal Op. 454, at 6-7 (2009) (opining that prosecutors must disclose exculpatory
evidence before a plea-agreement is signed, and this cannot be waived); United States v.
Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Thus, we have noted that where prosecutors have
withheld favorable material evidence, even a guilty plea that was knowing and intelligent may be
vulnerable to challenge.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Sanchez v. United
States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding pre-Ruiz, that defendant can argue that his
plea was not voluntary and intelligent because it was made in the absence of withheld Brady
material and this is an exception to the general rule that a defendant who pleads guilty waives
independent claims of constitutional violations); but see, e.g., Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353,
361-62 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Because a Brady violation is defined in terms of the potential effects of
undisclosed information on a judge's or jury's assessment of guilt, it follows that the failure of a
prosecutor to disclose exculpatory information to an individual waiving his right to trial is not a
constitutional violation."); see UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 107
(establishing that federal prosecutors do not need to disclose exculpatory information to
defendant before plea entered but rather 'reasonably promptly' after discovery); see generally,
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
152. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (explaining that the disclosure requirement
derived explicitly from the notion of "avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused") (emphasis
added); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (stating that defendant's right to
a fair trial is mandated by the Due Process Clause); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 453 (stating that "the
question is . .. whether we can be confident that the jury's verdict would have been the same");
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55 (1972) (explaining that failure to disclosure material impeachment
evidence at trial violates due process, because "evidence of any understanding or agreement of
future prosecution would be relevant to [the witness'] credibility and the jury was entitled to
know of it").
153. Such emphasis has spawned much disagreement over Brady v. Maryland's authority
outside of trial. See Klein et al., supra note 29, at 83 (identifying a circuit split on his issue);
Wiseman, supra note 21 (discussing the current state of Brady v. Maryland's application to guilty
pleas and identifying key decisions in various jurisdictions); see also United States v. Moussaoui,
591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (identifying cases that illustrate the circuit split).
154. See Klein et al., supra note 29, at 73 (comparing modem guilty pleas with traditional
criminal trials).
155. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 243 (1969)).
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1. The Scope ofRights Subject to Waiver in Guilty Plea Agreements Is
Expanding Rapidly
In today's guilty plea system, waivers have expanded to cover rights
far beyond just basic constitutional guarantees.156 Guilty plea waivers are
considered to be negotiated and bargained for between the parties and thus
are governed by contract principles rather than constitutional law.157
Consequently, over the last decade, prosecutors began incorporating
additional waivers as defensive measures to preempt later challenges and
guarantee the finality of guilty plea convictions."8 For example,
prosecutors now frequently request waivers of all discovery materials,
including both impeachment and exculpatory evidence subject to the
disclosure requirements of Brady v. Maryland.15 9 Such waivers are often
also accompanied by a waiver of the defendant's right to raise claims of
prosecutorial misconduct in failing to disclose such materials,16 0 waivers of
the right to appeal,161 and waivers of the defendant's right to collaterally
attack the conviction.162
156. See Klein et al., supra note 29 (discussing the emergence of modern waivers and
identifying those most prevalent in written plea agreements filed in federal courts); see also
Wiseman, supra note 21, at 971-74 (discussing the growth of waivers-focusing specifically on
DNA waivers); see also Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 127, 160 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court is "decidedly inhospitable to the notion
that any agreement by a criminal defendant to waive a right-either constitutional or statutory-
could be presumptively against public policy").
157. See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 16 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (treating a
guilty plea entered into voluntarily and knowingly as a contract between the government and the
defendant); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (holding that the petitioner had
bargained and negotiated for the plea); see Klein et al., supra note 29; see Scott & Stuntz, supra
note 4, at 1909-11 (examining different contract theories and their applicability to plea
bargaining).
158. See Klein et al., supra note 29, at 78 (describing defensive waivers as "non-trial related
waivers," and discussing extensively the national growth of such waivers in guilty pleas).
159. Id. at 77 n.21 (citing empirical evidence demonstrating the widespread incorporation of
such waivers in plea agreements).
160. Id. at 77.
161. Id.; see NORMAN ABRAMS, SARA SUN BEALE & SUSAN RIVA KLEIN, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 913-14 (West, 5th ed. 2010); see Susan R. Klein,
Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 DUQ. L. REv. 559, 562 (2013) ("Most constitutional criminal
procedural guarantees that protect suspects during the investigation and prosecution of state and
federal crimes are largely irrelevant in our world of guilty pleas and appeal waivers.")
(referencing the empirical data collected in Klein's study).
162. See Klein et al., supra note 29, at 81 (explaining that the majority of courts have upheld
collateral attack waivers unless such waivers were the result of ineffective assistance of counsel);
see, e.g., United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2008); Hurlow v. United States,
726 F.3d 958, 967 (7th Cir. 2013).
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2. Widespread Incorporation ofDefensive Waivers into Guilty Plea
Agreements Removes the Teeth from Any Potential Claim that an Innocent
Defendant May Develop After Entering the Plea
Today, such defensive waivers are essentially boilerplate terms in plea
agreements around the country,'6 3 and they place substantial limitations on
any innocent defendant's ability to attack a false conviction.'6 4 Ultimately,
by conditioning guilty pleas on defendants' "agreement" to waive their
rights, a prosecutor can foreclose any opportunity for a defendant to
challenge his or her conviction, even if the defendant later asserts
constitutional violations. For example, subsequent discovery of
suppressed Brady evidence or impermissible government conduct, which
may have factored heavily into an innocent defendant's decision to plead
guilty, are rendered useless where the defendant has waived his or her right
or opportunity to use such information.166 Consequently, these defendants
face an uphill battle to invalidate their guilty pleas and corresponding
waivers of rights. In fact, absent an affirmative indication that the guilty
plea failed to meet the Court's low standard for validity, an ineffective
assistance of counsel ("IAC") claim may be an innocent defendant's only
avenue for recoursel 6 7 -yet, even this right may be subject to waiver.'6 8
163. See Klein et al., supra note 29, at 83-84 (discussing Klein's findings in her examination
of all written plea agreements entered in federal courts, and using plea agreements made in the
Western District of Texas as an example).
164. Id at 92-93 (arguing that defensive waivers severely limit a pleading defendant's
ability to challenge his or her plea, and if defendants are permitted to waive their right to the
effective assistance of counsel, these defendants will be left without a forum for judicial review of
constitutional violations).
165. Id. at 79 (explaining that "an intelligent and voluntary plea of guilt generally bars the
collateral attack of . .. claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred
antecedent to the entry of a guilty plea"); see, e.g., Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 321-22
(1983) (stating that a Fourth Amendment claim ordinarily may not be raised in a habeas
proceeding following a guilty plea); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 n.13 (1970)
(refusing to address whether defendant's confession was coerced because his guilty plea was
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent).
166. See, e.g., Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
defendant's informed and voluntary waiver of the right to collaterally attack a sentence in plea
agreement bars relief); United States v. Khattack, 273 F.3d 557, 560-61 (3d Cir. 2001) (listing
ten other circuits upholding appeal waivers as barring later challenges).
167. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985) (stating "a defendant who pleads guilty
upon the advice of counsel may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty
plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in
McMann").
168. See Klein et al., supra note 29, at 88 (citing data Klein gathered, which was represented
in Appendix H of her article, and, Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains that Waive Claims of Ineffective
Assistance-Waiving Padilla and Frye, 51 DuQ. L. REv. 647, 648-50 (2013), which cited "broad
plea agreements requiring defendant to waive the right to appeal or collaterally attack the
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Moreover, successfully appealing a guilty plea conviction under an IAC
claim is highly unlikely.16 9 Innocent defendants cannot succeed in an JAC
action on the basis of prosecutorial nondisclosure because defense counsel
cannot be expected to discover suppressed exculpatory or impeaching
evidence in the sole possession of the government, much less provide
counsel on such information.170 As a result, innocent defendants that plead
guilty due to either governmental misconduct or a hopeless outlook-or
both-are left without recourse.
IV. Congress Must Act to Preserve the Integrity of Our Justice
System
A. Winship-the Reasonable Doubt Standard Is the Bedrock of Our
System
In 1970, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the constitutional
requirement of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" for criminal convictions
applies with equal force throughout the criminal justice system. '7' The
reasonable-doubt standard is recognized as a pillar of American criminal
procedure, which is grounded in the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.172  This standard is a foundational element, vital to the
American scheme of criminal procedure, as "it is a prime instrument for
reducing risk of convictions resting on factual error." 7 3  The Supreme
Court considers this standard to be so fundamental to the fair
administration of justice, that its necessity is obvious-the "standard
provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence-that
bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at
conviction and sentence in any post-conviction proceeding on any ground, except [if the sentence
exceeds the statutory maximum]") (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. For example, in McMann, the Supreme Court refused to consider the merits of the
defendant's claim that his guilty plea was induced by impermissible threats, violent beatings,
intentional misinformation, and deprivation of counsel, because his plea colloquy established a
prima facie case of voluntariness that could not be overcome absent a showing that his counsel's
advice was incompetent. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 772 (1970) (explaining "a plea
of guilty in a state court is not subject to collateral attack in a federal court on the ground that it
was motivated by a coerced confession unless the defendant was incompetently advised by his
attorney").
170. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985) (holding that ineffective assistance of
counsel claims related to guilty pleas follow the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington and
requires the defendant to demonstrate that the attorney's advice fell below the objective standard
of reasonableness).
171. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-64 (1970).
172. Id. at 361-62 (citing a body of Supreme Court precedent).
173. Id. at 363 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
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the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."'l74 Moreover, "a
society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should
not condemn a man for the commission of a crime when there is reasonable
doubt about his guilt."'7 5 Ultimately, the Court views the reasonable-doubt
standard as indispensable to commanding the respect and confidence of the
public in the criminal justice system. The Court explained:
It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also
important in our free society that every individual going
about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal
offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt
with utmost certainty.176
Concurring with this ruling, Justice Harlan stated, "I view the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as
bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."l77
Yet, evidence suggests that innocent defendants are convicted with
startling frequency.'7 8 While the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is enforced as a fundamental protection against the unjust conviction
of defendants at trial, defendants who forgo trial proceedings and plead
guilty are not afforded the deference that inherently lies within the
reasonable doubt standard. Thus, the force of the reasonable-doubt
standard seems to crumble under the weight of our new criminal justice
system ("a system of pleas rather than trials"),17 9 especially as defendants
are increasingly asked to waive their right to receive any material
information that may demonstrate reasonable doubt as to their guilt.'80
174. Id
175. Id. at 364.
176. Id.
177. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970).
178. See generally, supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
179. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407
(2010).
180. See Klein et al., supra note 29 (discussing the emergence of appeal waivers, collateral
attack waivers, discovery waivers, waivers of the right to effective assistance of counsel, and
others).
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B. The Legislature Can Create a Sufficiently Flexible Remedy
Unfortunately, though some may argue for the expansion of Brady v.
Maryland's interpretation by the Court, the judiciary faces many hurdles if
they intend to respond to the recent development of this problem. Bound by
an insurmountable body of precedent, the Court would need to completely
deconstruct its current approach to guilty pleas. On the other hand, the
legislature is poised with the flexibility required to respond to this problem
without overly burdening or destroying the beneficial nature of the plea
bargaining system. Simply placing an affirmative duty on prosecutors,
greater than that of the ABA, to make disclosures of Brady evidence prior to
entrance of plea agreements would provide pleading defendants with a
remedy should they discover that the government has withheld critical
information.
However, a much more viable solution may be establishing a statutory
remedy, which enables defendants to overcome waivers contained in their
plea agreements and challenge their guilty pleas under very narrow
circumstances, such as where material exculpatory or impeachment evidence
is discovered after conviction. Essentially, this remedy would expand upon
the right to appeal guilty plea convictions, which is statutorily derived.'81
However, unlike the current right to appeal, the Legislature should
affirmatively deny waivability. This would ensure that he statute's social
benefit is not neutralized by guilty plea waivers. Ironically, the strongest
way to protect innocent defendants may be to restrict their freedom to
relinquish their rights.
Plea bargaining plays a vastly important role in the American criminal
justice system, but at what cost? If the reasonable-doubt standard is so
indispensable to the integrity of our justice system, as to be the basis for
confidence by the common citizen, is not the conviction of even one innocent
man too many?l82
I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.
- In re Winship, Justice Harlan, (concurring).183
181. 28U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
182. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 ("It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not
be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary
affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.").
183. Idat 372.
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